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When entering the job market registered nurses (RNs) face job alternatives with differences in 
wages and other job attributes. Previous studies of the nursing labor market have shown large 
earnings differences between similar hospital and non-hospital RNs. Corresponding 
differences are found in some of the analyses of shift and regular daytime workers.  
 
In the first part of this paper I analyze the wage differentials in the Norwegian public health 
sector, applying a switching regression model. I find no hospital premium for the shift RNs 
and a slightly negative hospital premium for the daytime RNs, but it is not significant for the 
hospital job choice. I find a positive shift premium. The wage rate is 19% higher for the shift 
working hospital RNs and 18% for the sample of primary care workers. The shift premium is 
only weakly significant for the shift work choice for the sample of hospital RNs, and not for 
the primary care RNs. I identify some selection effects.  
 
In the second part of the paper I focus on the shift compensation only, and present a structural 
labor supply model with a random utility function. This is done to identify the expected 
compensating variation necessary for the nurses to remain on the same utility level when they 
are “forced” from a day job to a shift job. The expected compensating variations are derived 
by Monte Carlo simulations and presented for different categories of hours. I find that on 
average the offered combination of higher wages, shorter working hours and increased 
flexibility overcompensates for the health and social strains related to shift work.  
   3 
1. Introduction 
 
When entering the job market registered nurses (RNs) face job alternatives with differences in 
wages and other job attributes. Previous studies of the nursing labor market have shown large 
earnings differences between similar hospital and non-hospital RNs, and corresponding 
differences are found in some of the analyses of shift and regular daytime work.  
 
I will analyze the wage differentials in the public health sector using two different 
methodological approaches. In the first part of this paper I analyze the wage differentials with 
a switching regression model similar to the set-up presented in Lanfranchi et al. (2002). I 
examine the existence of wage differentials between RNs working in hospitals and primary 
care institutions, and between shift and daytime workers. I control for the shift dimension 
when I focus on the hospital premium, and for the care level when I analyze the shift 
premium.  
 
In an attempt to better capture the impact of preferences and choice I introduce a structural 
labor supply model with a random utility function in the second part of this paper. I limit the 
analysis to the shift compensation and shift choice, as the hospital premium is found to be 
insignificant. The RNs maximize utility, given a nonlinear budget set that incorporates taxes. 
The individual’s labor supply decision can be considered as a choice from a set of discrete 
alternatives (job packages). These job packages are characterized by attributes such as hours 
of work, sector specific wages, shift type, and other job-type specific aspects. The approach is 
inspired by i.a. Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and van Soest (1995). I use the structural 
framework to identify the expected compensation necessary for the nurses to remain on the 
same utility level when they are “forced” from a daytime job to a shift job. Using Monte 
Carlo simulations I present the distributions of the expected compensating variations for 
different categories of hours. The model may also be looked upon as a framework to inform 
public employers when deciding what size of wage compensation to offer.  
 
Rosen (1986) gives an introduction to the literature on compensating variations. 
“The theory of equalizing differences refers to observed wage differentials required to 
equalize the total monetary and non-monetary advantages or disadvantages among work 
activities and among workers themselves.” These ideas go back to the writings of Adam 4 
Smith. As presented by Rosen, the evidence of compensating variations related to a broad 
scope of working conditions, is mixed.  
 
It is a well–known fact that the inability to observe workers’ full labor market productivity 
can bias estimates of compensating wage differentials derived from cross-sectional labor 
market data. Hwang et al. (1992) demonstrate that the bias is a function of three factors: (i) 
the average share of total hourly remuneration taken in the form of wages, (ii) the proportion 
of wage dispersion due to the differing tastes of workers, and (iii) the degree of unobserved 
productivity heterogeneity. Their results provide the key for determining the likely size of the 
bias when estimating compensating wage differentials with real data.  
 
Many nursing services must be accessible on a twenty-four hour basis, making shift work a 
necessity. This opens up an opportunity to combine work and family life, which is often 
especially appreciated during the years with small children. However, while shift work may 
bring some wanted flexibility to nurses’ work schedule and additional income, it often 
introduces additional hardship on nurses providing services in complex environments and 
demanding interpersonal situations.  
 
The health strain of shift work is well documented. As far back as in 1713, Bernardino 
Ramazzini (Costa, 1996) pointed out the harmfulness of shift work, in particular night work. 
He wrote of the bakers, who ‘work at night, so when the others sleep they stay awake, while 
trying to sleep during the day like animals who escape the light: hence, in the same town there 
are men living in antithetic life in comparison with the others’. The medical interest for such a 
problem started between the two world wars and has increased over the past decades.  
 
A broad overview of concerns related to shift work is presented by Costa (1996). Shift work, 
particularly night work, can have a negative impact on the health and well-being of workers, 
particularly in four spheres: a) biological: due to the disturbance of normal circadian rhythms 
of psychophysiological functions, beginning with the sleep/wake cycle; b) working: coming 
from fluctuations in work performance and efficiency over the 24 hour span, with consequent 
errors and accidents; c) social: dealing with difficulties in maintaining the usual relationships 
both at family and social level, with consequent negative influences on marital relations, care 
of children and social contacts; d) medical: deterioration of health, which can manifest itself 
in disturbances of sleeping and eating habits and, in the long run, in more severe disorders 5 
that deal prevalently with the gastrointestinal, neuropsychical and, probably, cardiovascular 
functions. Costa especially stresses that shift and night work may have specific adverse 
effects on women’s health in relation to the hormonal and reproductive function.” In a study 
on young female nurses, Ohida et al. (2001) find a significant association between working 
night shifts and the use of alcoholic beverages to help induce sleep, as well as daytime 
drowsiness. 
 
Lanfranchi et al. (2002) report a significant shift premium. The wage rate for shift workers is 
16% higher than for daytime workers. This premium compensates workers who do not self-
select into shift work. They find that the shift premium is significant for shift work choice, 
and conclude that for their sample the shift choice is a result of wage differentials rather than 
shift preferences.  
 
One study focusing on RNs is Schumacher and Hirsch (1997). They find that on US data the 
shift premium to evening shift RNs is close to 4 percent, while for night shift RNs it is almost 
12 percent. They find a small insignificant premium for working rotating or split shifts over 
day shifts. Even though shift premiums are significant wage determinants, they account for 
just under 10 percent of the cross-sectional wage differential between hospitals and health 
practitioners’ offices, and little of the differential between hospitals and nursing homes. 
 
Lehrer et al. (1991) refer to the differences in job attributes between hospital and non-hospital 
settings. If hospital jobs involve relatively unpleasant characteristics such as a high degree of 
stress and job hazards, then in order to attract nurses of a given quality, hospitals must pay a 
compensating differential. In this paper I do not, however, compare hospital RNs with 
colleagues working in a practitioner's office, but with nurses working shifts at nursing homes 
and in home nursing. They may have an equal need for compensation to care for a less 
prestigious patient group often with less qualified colleagues and poorer staffing than is the 
case at the hospitals.     
 
An understanding of the hospital premium is important, especially given what is expected to 
be a large shift of medical care delivery away from hospitals towards outpatient settings. 
Schumacher and Hirsch (1997) argue that a plausible explanation for the hospital premium is 
that “hospitals demand, attract, and retain higher quality nurses than do employers in the non-
hospital sector, and these skills are not reflected fully in measured variables”. They report a 6 
hospital RN advantage of roughly 20 percent based on a cross-sectional analysis. When they 
extend their analysis to a longitudinal analysis they find that one third to half of the advantage 
is due to unmeasured worker ability. The remainder is likely to reflect compensating 
differentials for hospital disamenities. Older studies include Link (1988) who finds that there 
was a hospital premium of around 13 percent in 1984 (but does not find a premium with 1977 
data). Booton and Lane (1985) use data from a 1981 survey of Utah RNs and find that the 
hospital premium is largest for associate degree RNs (21 percent) and smallest for diploma 
RNs (15 percent). Lehrer et al. (1991), using a sample of Illinois RNs, note the large 
difference in earnings between hospital and non-hospital RNs. Although it is not the focus of 
their paper, they suggest that the premium may reflect a compensating differential.  
 
While there seems to be a hospital premium in the US health care sector, the setting is quite 
different in a National health sector in a Scandinavian country with a tradition for centralized 
wage bargaining and a monopsonistic buyer. The nurses union and NALRA bargain the wage 
nationally
1. However, there is some room for local adaptations of the wage policy. Hospitals 
and municipalities that have severe staff shortages or a high rate of turnover, offer higher 
wages than nationally agreed upon as well as other benefits in order to become a more 
attractive workplace.   
 
Shift hours in Norway are compensated with both an hourly wage premium and shorter 
mandated working hours for a full-time position. Health workers may choose shift work 
because of compensating wage differentials, but it is also possible that they have preferences 
for shift work. Compared to other studies of compensating variation, my study has the 
advantage of focusing on differentials within a single occupation, so that preferences and 
abilities are more homogeneous than for broader groups of workers. I find a positive shift 
premium, but no positive hospital premium. Actually, the hospital premium for the sample of 
daytime working RNs is slightly negative. The shift premium influences the shift choice for 
the hospital RNs. I also identify some selection effects.   
 
                                                 
1 In many European countries, compensating wage differentials are set by industry-wide collective bargaining 
and are adopted by non-unionized firms in the same industry. Hamermesh (1999) points to the fact that these 
bargained differentials are wider than the mostly market-generated premia that exist in the United States. 7 
As there is no hospital premium, I focus on the shift dimension in the application of the 
random utility model. I find that for most RNs the offered combination of a shift wage 
premium, shorter working hours and the flexibility of hours, overcompensates the negative 
effects of shift work.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the data and setting is presented. In section 3 a 
switching regression model with endogenous switching is established and the results 
presented. In section 4 a strategy for estimating compensated variation in a random utility 
model is presented. Section 5 discusses the results from the two approaches and concludes. 
 
 
2. Data  
 
The public health care providers are the dominant employers of Norwegian registered nurses. 
In 2002, 91.4 percent of those working within health and social services were public 
employees. The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (NALRA), 
organize employers in municipalities and counties who own the public institutions, . with the 
exception of some national hospitals. There were 77,819 registered nurses in 2002, of whom 
90% participated in the labor market. Those not participating were undertaking further 
education or enrolled in one of the social security programs, such as disability pension, 
medical or vocational rehabilitation or early retirement. For a general overview of the 
Norwegian health care system, see van den Noord et al. (1998) and European Observatory on 
Health Care Systems (2000).  
 
This study uses a sample of 11,542 female registered nurses employed by NALRA 
institutions in 2000. Being prior to the national hospital ownership reform, the counties 
demanded RNs for their hospitals, and the municipalities needed personnel for their health 
centers, nursing homes and home nursing. The attraction of limiting the analysis to NALRA 
employees is the information on hours of work and shift type. The data is only reported for 
one month by October 1
st. The NALRA register data is matched with annual labor income and 
other administrative data registers delivered by Statistics Norway. The set includes 
information about work experience and various sociodemographic variables, like the age of 
children and spouse’s income. I exclude nurses with other jobs than the NALRA job, and 
those not employed during the whole year.  8 
 
I focus on the occupational sub-category specified as “Registered Nurses” in the NALRA 
register, which is a group that normally has not undertaken any postgraduate training. I thus 
exclude midwifes and registered nurses working as nursing specialists or ward administrators. 
By restricting the analysis to the “ordinary” RNs I avoid the comparisons of groups with 
different formal qualifications and different management tasks. Daytime work, however, is 
strongly related to management tasks, and by omitting this personnel category from the 
analysis the sample of daytime RNs becomes relatively small compared to the shift worker 
sample. This may bias the results in that RNs incorporate a specialization and/or a 
management premium when choosing daytime work. The decision to exclude specialized 
nurses and health administrators allows me to focus on the hospital premium and the shift 
premium, but the alternative of including the other personnel categories is highly relevant in 
further research.     
 
Registered nurses dominate the hospital nursing services whereas auxiliary nurses play a more 
important role in nursing homes and in home nursing. At the local health centers and 
municipal casualty clinics the nursing staff consists mostly of RNs. Hospital nurses are 
generally confronted with more complicated and acute cases than nurses at the primary care 
level. However they normally work in teams with other RNs, and the patients are younger and 
with better prospects than those in nursing homes. In the nursing homes the RNs lead teams of 
auxiliary nurses and nurse assistants. Nurse assistants are personnel without any health 
qualification. In home nursing you work more independently but deal with more trivial health 
problems related to aging. 
 
Shift work is regulated by law and through agreements between NALRA and the nursing 
union. A registered nurse works 37.5 hours per week in a full-time position with daytime 
hours. Selecting a job that includes shift work will reduce this to 35.5 hours per week. Part-
time work is common and expressed as a percentage of full-time. The character of the shift 
work varies, from a combination of daytime and evenings to a combination of days, evenings 
and nights. Weekend work every third or fourth week is also common. Due to aggregation of 
the different compensation payments, I am unable to separate between the different shift 
forms. Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi et al. (2002) apply a similar shift measure.  
 9 
The alternatives available for NALRA nurses are hospital jobs with shift work, hospital jobs 
with daytime hours, primary care jobs with shift work and primary care jobs with daytime 
hours. The sample is almost equally divided between hospital and primary care jobs. Shift 
work is far more common than daytime work. See Table 1 for an overview of observed 
choices and hourly wages. Appendix 1 provides summary statistics for key individual level 
variables. 
 
Table 1 Observed job alternative and hourly wage.  
 Number  of  Hourly  wages     
   workers Mean St.dev. Min. Max.
Hospital daytime  803 146.5 12.9 121.2 184.3
Hospital shift work  5,154 172.2 20.1 126.3 225.2
Primary care daytime  589 146.8 13.5 120.2 188.8
Primary care shift work  4,996 172.7 19.4 128.7 225.5
Total sample  11,542       
 
Hourly wage is the applied earnings measure, calculated by dividing annual earnings reported 
to the tax authorities by the reported hours from the NALRA register. The reason why I do 
not apply the reported NALRA hourly wage, but instead construct the wages from annual 
income reports, is that only a small share of the NALRA institutions reports the wage 
completely. Shift compensation and other benefits are often unreported. From the RNs with 
complete data I can, however, observe that none of the RNs has a wage outside the wage 
interval NOK 120 – NOK 230. I thus omit the constructed wages outside this interval, a total 
of 1,404. These observations probably represent wrongly reported full-year participation or 
RNs who have changed their workload during the year, making the hours reported by October 
1 misleading.  
 
The observed mean wage is higher in shift work (NOK 172) than daytime work (NOK 147), 
but there seems to be almost no difference between the mean in hospital and primary care 
jobs. Remember that these wages are not yet corrected for individual characteristics. Hospital 
nurses are generally younger than primary care nurses, they work in more urban areas and 
have fewer children. Similarly, shift workers are younger than daytime workers. Corrections 
for these observed variables will be addressed below.   
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3. A switching regression model  
 
3.1 The model 
 
Lanfranchi et al. (2002) demonstrate how the estimation of a shift premium and shift choice 
fits well into the framework of switching regression models with endogenous switching. I 
follow their strategy but extend the focus to four types of job premiums for registered nurses 
in the public sector:  
 
a)  the shift premium for hospital nurses,  
b)  the shift premium for primary care nurses,  
c)  the hospital premium for shift working nurses, and  
d)  the hospital premium for nurses working regular daytime.  
 
I undertake four separate rounds of analysis, but I introduce the model with a notation suitable 
for the estimation of a shift premium. The estimation of a hospital premium is parallel. By 
categorizing the sample into different sub-categories I am able to apply the relatively simple 
set-up from Lanfranchi et al. but still use the richness of the data. I also avoid the pooling of 
samples as it seems reasonable to expect that the shift premium is different from hospital to 
primary care nurses, and similarly that the hospital premium is different for nurses working 
shifts and those working regular daytime. See i.a. Lanfranchi et al. (2002) for a discussion of 
the problems that arise with pooling of the data.  
 
The starting point is:  
 
shift wages:   s ss wX u β =+                            (1a) 
 
day wages:   dd d wX u β =+                            (1b) 
 
shift choice:   ()
*
sd SZw w v ηδ =+ − +                          (1c) 
 11 
where  s w and  d w  are log hourly wages, the vector X includes standard wage equation 
variables, while  s u and  d u  are error terms in the wage equations. The subscript s and d refer to 
shift work and regular daytime work.  
 
There may be selectivity into shift work. Let 
* S  be a latent variable for shift work with the 
corresponding binary variable S. S = 1 if 
* 0 S ≥  and S = 0 if 
* 0 S < . Z is a vector of variables 
influencing shift choice (including potential instruments), and v an error term. The term 
s d ww −  captures the shift premium.  
 
The error terms may be correlated giving rise to selectivity bias. Following Lanfranchi et al. 
(2001), let 
s uv σ  and 
d uv σ  represent the covariances between the error term in the choice 
equation, v, and the error terms in the wage equations,  s u and  d u  The covariance 
s uv σ  can be 
expected to be positive while 
d uv σ  can be expected to be negative. Suppose that we study a 
worker with abilities not captured by the exogenous variables in the shift work wage equation. 
These abilities are reflected in a higher wage. This in turn will give rise to a positive error 
term  s u . In addition, suppose that because of this higher wage the person becomes more 
likely to choose shift work than what is captured by the explanatory variables in the shift 
choice equation. We will then have a positive error term v. Moreover, the covariance 
s uv σ  will 
be positive. There will, in other words, be a positive selection into shift work. On the other 
hand, a positive selection into daytime work would imply that 
d uv σ  is negative.  
 
The reduced form of the choice equation is: 
 
()
* () sd s d SZ Xu u v ηδ β β δ =+ − + −+                            (2) 
 
which can be reparametrized to 
* SZ v η =+    . Following Maddala (1983), we can compute the 
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where including  ( ) /
s uv σφ +Φ  and  ( ) /
d uv σφ −Φ  in the respective wage equation will control 
for selectivity. φ  and Φ are the density and distribution functions of the standard normal 
evaluated at  Z η   . If we estimate the wage equation (1a) and (1b) without controlling for 
selectivity we will get biased estimates if the covariances are nonzero. Most likely, we will 
tend to underestimate the shift premium.  
 
The wage equations (1a) and (1b) and the choice equation (1c) is a switching regression 
model with endogenous switching. We can use it to estimate whether there are shift premiums 
and whether the shift premiums affect shift choice.  
 
The next steps are firstly, to estimate the reduced form (2) using a probit to get  ˆ η . I then 
compute  ()
ˆ ˆZ φ η    and  ()
ˆ ˆZ η Φ   . Secondly, I estimate the wage (3a) and (3b), including selection 
terms, to get  ˆ
s β  and  ˆ
d β ,  ˆ
s uv σ ,  ˆ
d uv σ , and compute the estimated expected wage premium 
() () ˆˆ ˆˆ sd sd ww X ββ −=− . I then estimate the structural form (1c) using probit to get  ˆ δ . If  ˆ
s uv σ  
and  ˆ
d uv σ  are significant in the wage equations, the correction for sample selection is needed. 
The above procedure is then repeated for case b) – d). The results are presented in Tables 2 
and 3 in Appendix 2 where they are presented in pairs by shift choice (a and b) and hospital 
choice (c and d).   
 
 
3.2 Wages, shift premiums, and shift choice. 
 
I will first present the results for the model of shift choice and the shift premium. The results 
are reported separately for the two samples; the hospital RNs (a) and the primary care RNs 
(b).  13 
 
Reduced form choice. I start by estimating the reduced form probit for shift choice (2) for the 
subset of hospital workers. Table A2.i column 1 in Appendix 2.1 reports marginal effects of 
the reduced form, whereas the next columns report standard errors and t-values. I will later 
discuss the parameters in the shift choice function to the structural form choice equation.  
 
While Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi et al. (2002) had access to data from different sectors 
with variations in contract terms, shift bonuses and shift rates for the different industries, I do 
not have any similar variation in data as all RNs get the same public sector contract. I must 
relate the shift choice to family life like marital status and children. Shift work gives less 
leisure time with your spouse and we should therefore expect that married nurses are less 
likely to choose shift work. On the other hand, shift work means increased flexibility to be 
there for your children and their activities in daytime. It is thus likely that parents of small 
children are more likely to choose shift work.  
 
None of the family characteristics are likely to have any direct influence on the wage. There is 
a possible indirect effect as having smaller children leads many nurses to reduce their 
workload or withdraw from the labor market temporarily thereby getting lower job tenure, 
which influences their salary. In many empirical studies the labor market experience is 
proxied by potential experience, i.e. age-education-7
2. This is a problematic upper bound for 
experience that is more upwardly biased for women, who tend to be more loosely connected 
to the labor market, at least in connection with maternity leave. In this study I have, however, 
controlled for the number of years with an income qualifying for pension entitlement during 
the last 23 years as a measure of experience. The measure is constructed on earnings histories 
available from the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme, which was established in 1967. 
Individual ‘pension entitlements’ in this scheme are linked to their income histories.  
 
Wage equations. The results from the reduced form probit can be used to control for sample 
selection when estimating wage equations for shift workers and daytime workers. The wage 
equations are presented in Table A3.i in Appendix 2.1. The first two sets of results (column 1-
3 and 4-6) are for the sample of hospital RNs. For the shift workers neither age nor experience 
                                                 
2 The RNs in this sample started in the primary school when aged 7. Today the children start school the year they 
get 6.  14 
is significant. The only dummy for country origin that is significant is the one for non-OECD 
countries. The county dummies are significant and with one exception they are negative 
compared to the reference of the capital Oslo. This is as expected as the reference group 
working for Oslo municipality has a separate wage contract with a somewhat higher wage. 
The dummies for municipal centrality are not significant, with the exception of one that is 
weakly significant for an intermediary centrality. For the daytime workers in the sample of 
hospital RNs there is a significant age effect where the wage is reduced by age. According to 
the agreed contract with the labor union, experience is one of the strongest criteria for 
increased wage. It is thus surprising that age has a negative sign in the wage equation. One 
possible explanation is that younger nurses are more willing to work overtime, somewhat 
increasing their average salary. Most dummies for county of residency are significant and 
negative.  
 
Although weakly significant, the selection term coefficients suggest a positive selection into 
shift work and no significant selection into daytime work. The RNs select themselves into 
shift work because of preferences or comparative advantages. This differs from the findings 
of Kostiuk (1990) who finds no effect of self-selection of workers into shift work, and 
Lanfranchie et al. (2002) who find that shift workers seem to prefer to avoid shift work. The 
shift wage premium, which is (weakly) significant for the choice of shift work in the 
structural probit results (Table A2.i column 4), increases the preference for shift work. I find 
no selection into daytime work, in contrast to the findings of Kostiuk and Lanfranchie et al.  
 
The estimated wage equations are somewhat different for the sample of primary care nurses. 
Experience, county dummies and one centrality dummy for the second highest centrality level 
are significant for the shift working primary care nurses. None of the explanatory variables 
are significant for the daytime workers. This accentuates the homogeneity of the sample with 
little variation in wages. For the shift working primary care RNs there is a negative selection 
into shift work, as opposed to the shift-selection term for the hospital RNs. There is no 
significant selection into daytime jobs. In the structural probit model (in Table A2.i column 
10) there is no significant effect of the shift wage premium on shift choice for the sample of 
primary care RNs.  
 15 
Structural form choice equations. Table A2.i column 4 and 10 presents the marginal effects in 
the structural form (1c) for the sample of hospital and primary care nurses respectively. The 
corresponding standard errors and t-values are also reported. As already mentioned, the shift 
premium is weakly significant for the shift choice for the hospital RNs and not significant for 
the primary care RNs. The top rows of Table A2.i report the results for variables only 
appearing in the choice equation. Both the dummy for marital status and the number of 
children below 6 years of age are significant, and the signs are as expected for the sample of 
hospital RNs. The number of children from 6 to 11 years of age is only weakly significant. 
None of the three selection variables are significant for the sample of primary care RNs. The 
lack of variable significance for the latter group is not easily interpreted but hospital RNs are 
generally younger than primary care RNs and a smaller percentage is married.  
 
The bottom rows report the results for variables also appearing in the wage equations. For the 
hospital RNs, age becomes weakly significant, as well as experience. The probability of 
selecting a shift job is estimated to decrease by age and experience.  
 
Whereas it is less likely for a RN from one of the other Nordic countries to choose a shift job, 
it is more likely for RNs from other countries. For the hospital sample, the county dummies 
are mostly positive and significant for the shift choice, but not for the primary care sample. 
The centrality dummies are not significant.  
 
The two wage equations for shift and daytime workers can be used to compute the shift 
premium for each person in the sample. The average shift premium for the sample of hospital 
nurses is 19.3%, while the shift premium for the sample of primary care nurses is 18.1%. The 
shift premiums are sharply determined with t-values of 293.3 and 330.0. 
 
 
3.3 Wages, hospital premiums, and hospital choice. 
 
I now shift the focus to the analysis of hospital versus primary care choice and the hospital 
premium. Tables A2.ii and A3.ii in Appendix 2.2 presents the results for two samples; the 
RNs working shifts (c), and the RNs working regular daytime hours (d).  16 
 
Reduced form choice. I start by estimating the reduced form probit for hospital choice (2) in 
the subset of shift working RNs. Table A2.ii column 1 reports marginal effects of the reduced 
form. Marital status and children may be correlated with hospital choice in several ways. 
Given the stress and demanding environment at a hospital many RNs prefer to switch to a 
primary care job that is easier to combine with family life when they get children. There is 
also an indirect geographical effect as many RNs move out of the city centers to the suburbs 
and rural areas when they become parents. With most hospitals centrally located, they are able 
to reduce their travel time if they take a job in a nursing home or in home nursing.  
 
Wage equations. The wage equations for the sample selection models with hospital choice are 
presented in Table A3.ii in Appendix 2.2. The first two sets of results (column 1-3 and 4-6) 
are for the sample of shift RNs. In contrast to the primary care workers, age, experience or 
country background is not significant in the wage equation for the hospital workers. Most 
geographical dummies are strongly significant and negative, meaning that they earn less than 
the RNs working in Oslo, the capital. There is a positive and significant selection into both 
hospital and primary care jobs for the sample of shift working RNs.  
 
Few of the variables are significant in the two wage equations for the sample of daytime 
working RNs. Age and experience and some of the county dummies are significant for the 
hospital workers. There is no selection effect for the hospital workers. For the primary care 
workers there is a weakly significant positive selection effect.   
 
Structural form choice equations. Table A2.ii column 4 and 10 presents the marginal effects 
in the structural form (1c) for hospital choice for the samples of shift and daytime RNs 
respectively. The hospital premiums are not significant for the hospital choice for any of the 
two samples. For the sample of shift working RNs, marital status and the number of children 
from 6 to 11 years of age is significant for the choice of a hospital job. For the sample of RNs 
working regular daytime only the number of children from 6 to 11 years of age is (weakly) 
significant.  
 17 
The results for the explanatory variables also used in the wage equations are as follows. For 
the sample of shift working RNs, age is a negative and significant variable in the structural 
form equation of hospital choice, whereas experience is not. The opposite is the case for the 
daytime working RNs. Of the shift working nurses, those with a non-OECD background are 
less likely to choose a hospital job. Of the day-working nurses, those from the other Nordic 
countries are more likely to choose a hospital job, but this effect is only weakly significant. 
Most of the geographical dummies are strongly significant and negative for both samples 
meaning that they are less likely to work in a hospital job than the reference group in the 
capital.  
 
The average hospital premium for the sample of shift working nurses is -0.04%, while the 
hospital premium for the sample of daytime working nurses is –1.7%. The hospital premium 
for the nurses working shifts are, however, not significantly different from zero with a t-value 
of 1.37. The t-value is 18.73 for the nurses working daytime. 
 
A summary of results so far 
Before I present the random utility model, I will summarize the results so far. The first finding 
is that there is a highly significant shift premium of 19.3% for the sample of hospital RNs and 
18.1% for the primary care RNs. However, the shift premium is only weakly significant for 
the shift work choice for the sample of hospital RNs, and not for the primary care RNs. There 
seems to be a positive selection into shift work for the nurses working in hospitals, but a 
negative selection into shift work for the nurses in primary care jobs. There is no selection 
effect into the daytime jobs.  
 
I find no hospital premium for the shift RNs, and a slightly negative hospital premium of –
1.7% for the daytime working RNs, but it is not significant for the hospital job choice. There 
is a positive selection into hospital and primary care jobs for the sample of shift RNs. There is 
no selection into hospital jobs and a positive selection into primary care jobs for the day-
working RNs. 
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The selection equation (1c) may be looked upon as a simplified choice model where the 
individual wage rate determines the selection of job type. The random utility model presented 
in the next section takes choices one step further to integrate choice and a richer specification 
of preferences in the modeling. I will restrict the analysis to the shift choice and shift 
compensation as the hospital premium seems to be of minimum significance in the Norwegian 
public health sector.  
 
  
4. Compensating variation in random utility models 
 
4.1 A random utility model 
 
In order to calculate the compensating differentials in utility terms, I present a static neo-
classical structural labor supply model with single decision makers. The individual’s utility 
depends on income, leisure and other characteristics of the jobs. The utility maximization 
problem is solved by discretizing the budget set and choosing the optimal shift type, leisure 
and income combination from a finite set of alternatives. Conditioning on their participation 
in the public health care sector, the nurses are facing a choice between a shift job or a day job 
(i = s,d). As explained above I omit the analysis of the hospital premium in this part of the 
paper.  
 
Because the analyst does not know the nurses’ preferences, I will assume a random utility 
model  
 
() ( ) () () ,, , ,, U Chi V C h h eChi =+ ,                 ( 4 )  
 
where U is the utility when the nurse works h hours with shift type i (shift job or a day job). C 
is disposable income. V is the deterministic element in the utility function and ε is a stochastic 
term with an iid extreme value distribution with an expected mean of 0 and a variance of 
22
* /6 σπ . The random term ε also captures the unobserved job characteristics associated with 
the workload and shift type.  
 
The budget constraint, for a job with shift type i, is 19 
 
C=f(hw)+I; h=Hik ,  w=Wi(Hik),                                            (5) 
 
where Hik  (i=d,s,  k=1,…,9) are the specific hours of work for the alternative with shift type i 
and hours of work k, and Wi(Hik) the pre-tax hourly wage for the job-package with shift type i 
when the individual is working Hik hours. The wage is a piecewise linear relation capturing 
the agreed terms of overtime compensation. Note that for the same job, wage rates may differ 
across nurses by personal characteristics like experience, residency and country background. 
In addition, for the same nurse, wage rates may differ with shift type. For all individuals a 
pre-tax hourly wage is estimated for each shift type applying a Heckman two-step selection 
correction procedure. The f(.) function represents the net-of-tax labor income while I is the 
family income other than the nurse’s own earnings (capital income after tax, spouses income 
after tax, and transfers)
3.  
 
Each category of hours is centered on a common choice of working hours, e.g. 50%, 75% and 
100% of a full-time position. There are also categories for extended full-time, covering nurses 
in full-time positions working overtime, or people with jobs at more than one hospital where 
the workload totals more than 100%. As the nurses working shifts face different contractual 
arrangements than those working daytime, the hours are shorter for this group
4.  
 
I assume that the nurses make their choices by maximizing utility, given the job-packages 
available in the market. Let B(i,h) denote the set of feasible jobs with hours of work Hik equal 
to h, with shift type i. Let ( ) i gh be the frequency of jobs in B(i,h), which is related to the 
institutional availability of full-time jobs. It follows from above that the utility function can be 
written as 
 
                                                 
3 A non-trivial assumption made is that the spouse’s hours of work is exogenous, as there is reason to believe 
that the spouse’s choice of working hours will correlate, either negatively, e.g. if one of the parents must look 
after the children, or positively as they have preferences for spending their leisure time together. 
4 The hours per week in the categories, based on the observed means, are Hi ={11.5, 17.9, 21.6, 26.3, 28.2, 30.6, 
35.4, 36.6, 40.7} if the nurse work shifts and Hi ={12.2, 18.9, 22.8, 27.8, 29.8, 32.3, 37.4, 38.6, 42.9} if the 
nurse does not work shifts. 20 




() () () () ,, , ik ik i ik ik f HW H IH ik εε =+                 (7) 
 
Since hours of work and consumption are given when the job-package is given, the agent's 
choice problem is a discrete one, namely to find the job-package that maximizes utility. Let 
(, ) Pih denote the probability of the agent choosing a job-package with shift type i and hours 
of work h. This is the same as choosing a job-package (any job-package) within B(i,h). When 
the random error terms { ik ε  } are iid extreme value distributed, the probability ( , ) Pih can be 
expressed as 
 
(, ) Pih= P(choosing any job-package within B(i,h))  
 




exp( ( , ; , )) ( )
,









                                   (8) 
 
where B is the set of feasible combinations of shift type and hours of work, and 
 
() ( ) () ik ik i ik ik ik (i,h;w,I) v f H W H I,H V / . ψ σ =+ =        
     (9) 
 
Due to the assumption of extreme value distributed utilities it follows that the choice 
probabilities are multinomial logits. By setting  ( ) i gh= 1 in (8) we get the standard 21 
multinomial logit. The interpretation of the “opportunity density extended” version of the 
standard multinomial logit, given in (8), is that the attractiveness of a choice measured by 
exp( ) ψ  is weighted by a function saying how available this choice is in the market. The 
weight is determined by  
 
( ) exp( ) ii gh k ς =                                       (10) 
 
where  i k  = 1 if the main job is full-time with shift type i (35.5 hours per week if shift, 37.5 
hours per week if daytime), and  i k  = 0 otherwise. For more details about this methodology I 
refer to Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999). 
 
The deterministic part of the preferences is represented by the following “Box-Cox” type 
utility function:  
 
















0 10 50000 ik ik CC C
− −= −   
 








=+ ∑       
 
The first element represents the utility from consumption and the second element the utility of 
leisure time. See Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm 
(1999) for an empirical analysis applying this specification. One advantage of this 
specification is that it is flexible enough to yield both negative (backward bending labor 
supply curve) and positive wage elasticities.  
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A minimum consumption of NOK 50,000 is introduced in the consumption element. 8,760 is 
the total number of annual hours, from which 12 hours per day for sleep and rest is subtracted 
in the leisure element. κ  ,λ , γ  and the s ρ′  are unknown parameters. For the utility function 
to be quasi-concave, we require λ <1 and γ <1. Note that if  0 λ →  and  0 γ → , the utility 
function converges to a log-linear function.  
 
An alternative specification is to use a semi-parametric approach like van Soest (1995), where 
the deterministic part of the preferences is represented by a polynomial. 
Due to the calculation of the compensating variation (CV) below I stay with the Box-Cox 
formulation.  
 
The characteristics are: X1 = Age of the nurse/10. X2 = Number of children below six years of 
age. X3 = Number of children between 6 and 11 years of age. X4 = 1 if the person is born in 
Norway, 0 otherwise. X5 = 1 if the person is married, 0 otherwise.  
The parameters (κ, λ, γ,  0 ρ , q ρ ,ς ) are estimated in a maximum-likelihood procedure. Note 
that σ is not identified and is absorbed in κ  and ρ ’s.  
 
Compensating variation 
We are interested in the value in utility terms of a change of shift type from daytime job d to 
the shift job s, for a specific workload. We measure the utility with the expected value of the 
compensating variation  h z .  
 
First we define  h z  in  
 
(( ) , ) (( ) , ) dh dh sh h sh UCw L UCw z L =−                          (13) 
or  
 
(( ) , ) (( ) , ) dh dh dh sh h sh sh vCw L vCw z L ε ε += − +                                                      (14) 
 
If the shift alternative is more attractive than the day job for a given workload measured in 
percentage of a full-time position,  h z  is a measure of the over-compensation of the shift job.  
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Given the choice of a Box-Cox function from (11), we can insert it into (14). For a specific 
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I will try to identify the size of  k z  using a Monte Carlo simulation. However, to simplify this 
process I first rearrange (15) to the following expression 
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=− + −   
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                     
  (17) 
 
k K is deterministic and can be calculated for each individual when we have estimated the 
parameters of the model. (16) may now be represented as  
 
() ( ) 0 skk kd k s k Cw z C K
λ
κε ε −− = + −                            (18) 
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We know that the difference between two extreme value variables is logistic distributed. 
Thus, if  dk ε and  sk ε are iid extreme values, then 
*
dsk dk sk ε εε = − follows the logistic distribution. 
The next step is to simulate  k z using a Monte Carlo simulation where I take 50 draws from the 
logistic distribution for each category of hours for each individual. For each draw of 
*
dsk ε , I 




0 ˆ ˆ max 0, skk k d s k Cw z C K
λ
κε −− = +                            (19) 
 
This is to avoid that the consumption you give up as measured by  ˆk z  gives you a lower 
consumption than the minimum level of  0 C . The result is two formulas to calculate  ˆk z : 
 
If 
* ˆ 0 kd s k K ε +≤  then  0 ˆ () ks k zC w C =−                         (20) 
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for each individual n, and each category of hours k. The last step is to calculate the mean per 










= ∑                               (23) 
 
Given that the utility function can be given a cardinal interpretation I may present the mean 
and the standard deviation of  k CV  and plot the distribution for each category of hours. If I 
restrict the utility function to be cardinal, I can only report the number of nurses who have a 
0 kn CV >  and  0 kn CV ≤ .  
 
 
4.2 Estimation and results 
 
Job-specific wages and disposable income 
The first step in the estimation procedure is to derive predicted hourly wages not only for the 
shift type and care level they actually work in, but also for the other alternatives.  The wages 
are individual specific depending on personal characteristics like age, experience, country 
background and residency, and are estimated by a Heckman selection correction procedure. 
Overtime hours are compensated in accordance with the agreed terms. As the wages were 
discussed in detail in Section 3, I will only refer to Table A4 in Appendix 3. Above, I used a 
two-step Heckman procedure with a Probit model for covering the probabilistic structure of 
choice. Here, the latter is logistic, but the outcome on the wages of a Logit instead of a Probit 
is minimal (Dagsvik et al. (1987)).   
 
A disposable income is calculated for each job package, defined by care level, shift type and 
categories of hours. I use the predicted hourly wages, and actual non-linear tax rates to 
calculate labor income after tax, and add the actual capital income, social security benefits 
and spouse’s income. The first column in Table A8 presents the difference in disposable 
income for a shift job versus a day job for the nine categories of hours. The mean shift 
premium is positive and higher in hospitals as shown in Section 3.2, but for all alternative 
hours there are some individuals who have a negative shift premium. The mean difference is 
NOK 19,000 for a full-time position in the hospital sector or approximately 4% of the 
disposable income for the day alternative. This is illustrated for the case of full-time jobs by 
the histogram of the difference in disposable income in favor of the shift jobs in Figure A1, 
Quadrant 1.  26 
 
Estimation of structural parameters  
Based on the knowledge of disposable income and leisure measured by hours of work for all 
alternative job packages for each individual, I estimate the structural model. The parameters 
are estimated separately for the samples of hospital and primary care nurses. Remember that 
for the same percentage of a full-time job the nurses work shorter hours if they work in a shift 
job. I have restricted the sample to those with a non-work income between NOK 100,000 and 
NOK 500,000 in order to limit the impact of outliers in the analysis.  
 
From Table A5 we observe that almost all parameters are sharply determined and that λ  and 
γ  are estimated to yield a quasi-concave utility function. For the hospital nurses the income 
term in the utility function (11) is estimated with λ  to be 0.285, and α  to 2.828 such that 
increased income increases the deterministic utility.  
 
The γ  in the leisure component is estimated to -0.320.  0 β  is positive with a value of 6.567, 
meaning that the average individual has an increased utility of jobs with shorter working 
hours. The other  s β  are, however, negative. This means that the RNs tend to choose jobs 
with less part-time work the older they are, and that the same goes for nurses with children 
aged between 6 and 11 and married nurses. The number of children below 6 years of age is 
not significant. The g-function in (8) with a dummy representing a full-time position is 
represented with the significant parameter ς of 1.064. 
 
The parameters estimated for the primary care nurses follows the same pattern as for the 
hospital RNs with the exception of some of the  s β . Age is not significant, but age squared is 
significant and has a negative sign. Surprisingly 3 β , the parameter for the number of children 
below 6 years of age is negative, as well as the parameters for the number of children between 
6 and 11 years, marital status, and whether you are born in Norway.  
 
Deterministic utility 
The second group of columns in Table A6 presents the difference in deterministic utility 
between the shift job and the daytime job. It is worth noting that the mean difference is 
positive in favor of the shift jobs for all categories of hours. This is illustrated for the case of 27 
full-time jobs by the histogram of the difference in deterministic utility in favor of the shift 
jobs in Figure A1, Quadrant 2.  
 
Compensating variation 
The results from the Monte Carlo simulations are presented in the third group of columns in 
Table A6. The compensating variation is presented for the variable  k CV  for the nine 
alternative categories of hours. For all alternatives the mean is positive, with the exception of 
the jobs with shortest working hours, the category of 32.5% of a full-time position, which has 
a negative mean. However, a positive  k CV means that the RNs on average are so satisfied 
with their shift jobs, being rewarded with higher wages, shorter working hours and increased 
flexibility, that they actually would accept a lower wage than they are offered today and still 
be better or equally well off with a shift job. For a full-time job the  k CV  equals NOK 26,000 
or 5.7% of the annual disposable income for the household. The minimum value for the 
simulated  k CV  is -63,680 NOK and the maximum is NOK 96,500. For the full-time 
alternative 90 % has  7 0 CV >  meaning that the majority gains from having a shift job, or in 
other words that the RNs could accept a reduction in the shift compensation and still prefer 
the shift alternative. For half-time jobs the percentage with  4 0 CV >  is 62% of the RNs, while 
for those working in a one third of a full-time position, we have that  1 0 CV >  for 29% for the 
hospital RNs and 27% for the primary care RNs.  
 
Generally the differences between shift jobs and daytime jobs are smaller in primary care both 
when focusing on the shift premium measured in disposable income, and compensating 
variation expressed by  k CV . For all categories of hours a histogram for  k CV  and the share 
with a positive  k CV  are presented in Figure A2 and A3. In Figure A4 and A5 the  k CV  is 
plotted by age for 50%, 75% and 100% positions for hospital and primary care jobs. The 
compensation needed seems to be rather stable across age groups.  
 
I have not conditioned on the RNs’ actual choices in the calculation of the  k CV . I still 
consider the calculations as a relevant approximation of the compensation necessary. The 
statistical derivation of a more correct expression, contingent on their actual choices is 
technically more complex and an obvious topic for further research.  28 
5. Conclusions 
 
In the first part of this paper I applied a switching regression model to identify the 
compensating differentials for registered nurses. The first finding was that there is a 
significant shift premium of 19.3% for the sample of hospital RNs and 18.1% for the primary 
care RNs. However, the shift premium is only weakly significant for the shift work choice for 
the sample of hospital RNs, and not significant for the primary care RNs. There seems to be a 
positive selection into shift work for the nurses working in hospitals, but a negative selection 
into shift work for the nurses in primary care jobs. There is no selection effect into the 
daytime jobs.  
 
In contrast to the previous published results I found no hospital premium for the shift RNs, 
and a slightly negative hospital premium of –1.7% for the daytime working RNs. The 
negative hospital premium is not significant for the hospital job choice. There is a positive 
selection into hospital and primary care jobs for the sample of shift RNs. There is no selection 
into hospital jobs and a positive selection into primary care jobs for the dayworking RNs.  
 
In the second part of the paper I focused on the shift premium and shift choice as the hospital 
premium seems to be of minimum significance in the Norwegian public health sector. I 
presented a structural labor supply model with a random utility function to identify the 
expected compensation necessary for the nurses to remain on the same utility level when they 
are “forced” from a day job to a shift job. The expected compensating variations were derived 
by Monte Carlo simulations and the distribution presented for different categories of hours. I 
found that on average the offered combination of higher wages, shorter working hours and 
increased flexibility overcompensated for the health and social strain related to shift work. 
The simulations indicated that the average nurse would choose a shift job even if the shift 
compensation was reduced by 5% of the disposable income.  
 
It is widely known that a focusing only on wage differentials may be misleading when 
evaluating compensating mechanisms, as the other attributes of a nursing job, such as job 
flexibility and working hours, also compensate the negative effects of shift work. A structural 
labor supply model with a random utility function makes it possible to better include the non-29 
pecuniary characteristics of jobs in the analysis, and thus to better inform the policy makers 
who are trying to find an optimal compensation package in a public health sector with a 
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Appendix 1 Key variables 
 
 
Table A1 Key variables 
    
Female registered nurses in 2000  Mean Std Dev
    
N 11,542 
Age 40.2 10.2
Born in Norway=1  0.92 0.27
Single 0.29 0.45
Married 0.60 0.49
Number of children  2.0 1.0
    
Lives in a central area (Cat. 6&7 out of 7)  0.70 0.46
Years since graduation  13.3 11.0
Number of years employed (income >1G) since 1967  10.9 7.6
Hours per year   1,363 347
Work shifts  0.88 0.33
% Position   0.81 0.21
Income from work, NOK  237,914 56,953
Social security benefits, NOK  21,037 28,229
Total income, NOK   264,990 68,815
Income after tax  196,376 50,422
    
Age of spouse (N=7,753)  45.7 9.6
Total annual income, spouse  403,774 416,579
Annual income after tax, spouse  277,146 328,507
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Appendix 2.1. A switching regression model to identify the shift premium 
 
Table A2.i Shift choice, probit models, marginal effects. (Case a and b) 
                       
 
Case a) 
Shift work choice if hospital RNs   
Case b)  
Shift work choice if primary care RNs 
  Reduced form    Structural form  Reduced form   Structural form 
                       
Variable dF/dx Std. E. t-values  dF/dx Std. E. t-values dF/dx Std. E. t-values dF/dx  Std. E. t-values 
      
Shift premium        3.555 1.951 1.78      1.917  2.762 0.7 
                     
Married -0.020 0.009 -2.24   -0.036 0.012 -2.82 0.002 0.009 0.2 -0.001  0.010 -0.08 
No. of children <6 years of 
age  0.027 0.010 2.75   0.048 0.015 3.09 0.024 0.009 2.52 -0.014  0.056 -0.26 
No. of children aged 6-11  0.008 0.007 1.16   0.015 0.008 1.86 0.005 0.007 0.77 -0.003  0.014 -0.24 
                     
Age -0.047 0.112 -0.42   -0.893 0.477 -1.83 0.202 0.116 1.75 -0.013  0.331 -0.04 
Age^2/100 0.168 0.399 0.42   2.992 1.599 1.83 -0.736 0.408 -1.8 0.093  1.263 0.07 
Age^3/1000 -0.259 0.616 -0.42   -4.338 2.319 -1.83 1.166 0.625 1.86 -0.224  2.098 -0.11 
Age^4/10000 0.144 0.349 0.41   2.288 1.226 1.82 -0.672 0.351 -1.91 0.168  1.260 0.13 
Experience -0.027 0.017 -1.59   -0.079 0.033 -2.31 -0.054 0.017 -3.07 -0.092  0.057 -1.62 
Experience^2/100 0.062 0.258 0.24   0.746 0.453 1.61 0.465 0.266 1.74 0.778  0.524 1.49 
Experience^3/1000 0.156 1.524 0.1   -3.875 2.671 -1.43 -1.610 1.569 -1.02 -2.444  1.980 -1.24 
Experience^4/10000 -0.598 3.032 -0.2   8.017 5.584 1.41 1.655 3.117 0.53 2.107  3.188 0.66 
Born in a Nordic country 
excl. Norway  -0.051 0.023 -2.5   -0.095 0.038 -3.03 -0.018 0.025 -0.75 -0.051  0.060 -0.98 
Born in an OECD country 
excl. Nordic  0.033 0.020 1.44   0.083 0.014 2.19 -0.042 0.033 -1.45 0.031  0.079 0.33 
Born in a non-OECD country  0.040 0.020 1.64   0.074 0.015 2.39 0.047 0.020 1.79 0.056  0.021 1.88 
                     
Place of residency 
(C3=Oslo)                     
County 1 Østfold  0.076 0.009 5.3   0.091 0.008 4.44 0.059 0.029 1.44 0.089  0.032 1.25 
County 2 Akershus  0.038 0.013 2.49   0.050 0.012 3.07 0.028 0.042 0.59 0.091  0.047 0.83 
County 4 Hedmark  0.075 0.010 4.23   0.046 0.026 1.36 0.057 0.029 1.37 0.091  0.030 1.12 
County 5 Oppland  0.089 0.007 5.81   0.101 0.006 3.95 0.075 0.020 2.12 0.091  0.020 1.77 
County 6 Buskerud  0.079 0.008 5.71   -0.351 0.424 -1.09 0.023 0.045 0.46 0.018  0.048 0.34 
County 7 Vestfold   0.071 0.010 4.3   0.077 0.009 4.62 0.042 0.037 0.91 0.090  0.036 0.94 
County 8 Telemark  0.075 0.010 4.34   0.042 0.029 1.19 0.038 0.038 0.8 0.078  0.041 0.97 
County 9 Aust-Agder  0.068 0.011 3.75   -0.027 0.088 -0.34 0.027 0.043 0.56 0.078  0.045 0.85 
County 10 Vest-Agder  0.082 0.007 6.93   0.049 0.026 1.48 0.059 0.028 1.46 0.073  0.027 1.57 
County 11 Rogaland  0.071 0.008 5.65   0.051 0.016 2.48 0.045 0.036 1.01 0.082  0.046 1.09 
County 12 Hordaland  0.051 0.010 4.18   -0.023 0.055 -0.44 0.056 0.032 1.33 0.101  0.043 1.07 
County 13 Sogn og Fjordane  0.053 0.018 2.12   -0.295 0.316 -1.25 0.061 0.027 1.5 0.075  0.025 1.58 
County 14 Møre og Romsdal  0.056 0.015 2.8   0.027 0.027 0.89 0.065 0.029 1.58 0.083  0.031 1.61 
County 15 Sør-Trøndelag  0.081 0.007 7.41   0.103 0.009 4.23 0.022 0.045 0.45 0.087  0.047 0.79 
County 16 Nord-Trøndelag  0.085 0.007 6.15   0.059 0.021 1.96 0.070 0.023 1.89 0.082  0.022 1.88 
County 17 Nordland  0.063 0.013 3.29   0.055 0.015 2.66 0.051 0.033 1.16 0.093  0.038 1.05 
County 18 Troms  0.052 0.021 1.76   0.085 0.011 2.45 0.028 0.042 0.59 0.089  0.049 0.84 
County 19 Finnmark  0.056 0.023 1.67   0.091 0.007 2.34 0.031 0.043 0.62 0.037  0.042 0.73 
                     
Municipal Centrality (7=Most 
central)                     
Municipal Centrality 1  0.038 0.018 1.77   -0.001 0.036 -0.04 -0.027 0.016 -1.78 0.010  0.050 0.2 
Municipal Centrality 2  -0.013 0.025 -0.55   0.000 0.024 0 0.012 0.021 0.54 -0.031  0.075 -0.45 
Municipal Centrality 3  -0.003 0.023 -0.15   0.038 0.025 1.28 -0.001 0.019 -0.06 0.047  0.059 0.66 
Municipal Centrality 4  -0.003 0.043 -0.08   -0.803 0.274 -1.77 0.021 0.017 1.15 0.013  0.022 0.55 
Municipal Centrality 5  0.026 0.017 1.4   -0.069 0.075 -1.09 -0.041 0.023 -1.99 -0.003  0.052 -0.06 
Municipal Centrality 6  0.000 0.016 0.02     -0.015 0.019 -0.8 -0.002 0.015 -0.15 0.040  0.055 0.65 
                      
Log  likelihood  -2,007.2     -2,005.6   -1,774.6   -1,774.3    
chi squared  696.53      699.78   214.24   214.72    
Significance  level  0.000     0.000   0.000   0.000    
pseudo R2  0.1479      0.1485   0.0569   0.0571    
Number of observations  5,957         5,957        5,585        5,585       
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1                 
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Table A3.i Wage equations, sample selection models. Shift RNs and daytime RNs (Case a and b). 
                       
 
Case a) 
Wage equations if hospital RNs   
Case b)  
Wage equations if primary care RNs 
                        
  Shift workers    Daytime workers  Shift workers    Daytime workers 
                       
 Coef. Std. E.t-values    Coef. Std. E.t-values  Coef. Std. E.t-values  Coef. Std. E.t-values
                       
Age 0.015 0.039 0.37 -0.215 0.107 -2.02 0.026 0.048 0.54 0.082 0.167 0.49
Age^2/100 0.013 0.147 0.09 0.779 0.368 2.11 -0.058 0.175 -0.33 -0.238 0.593 -0.4
Age^3/1000 -0.102 0.238 -0.43 -1.204 0.554 -2.17 0.039 0.275 0.14 0.289 0.913 0.32
Age^4/10000 0.095 0.140 0.68 0.673 0.305 2.2 0.002 0.158 0.01 -0.123 0.513 -0.24
Experience 0.004 0.005 0.73 -0.007 0.021 -0.35 0.018 0.006 2.94 -0.043 0.030 -1.42
Experience^2/100 0.037 0.087 0.43 0.238 0.272 0.88 -0.100 0.092 -1.1 0.402 0.349 1.15
Experience^3/1000 -0.469 0.555 -0.84 -1.733 1.502 -1.15 0.177 0.566 0.31 -1.350 1.792 -0.75
Experience^4/10000 1.139 1.171 0.97 3.848 2.860 1.35 0.095 1.176 0.08 1.255 3.299 0.38
Born in a Nordic country excl. 
Norway 0.005 0.008 0.6 0.006 0.016 0.35 0.015 0.009 1.63 -0.012 0.023 -0.54
Born in an OECD country 
excl. Nordic  0.017 0.011 1.54 0.040 0.026 1.58 -0.005 0.012 -0.41 0.001 0.028 0.05
Born in a non-OECD country   0.022 0.011 2.1 0.032 0.027 1.21 0.006 0.012 0.48 0.062 0.047 1.33
                       
Place of residency (C3=Oslo)                       
County 1 Østfold  -0.040 0.010 -4.13 -0.051 0.031 -1.65 -0.125 0.055 -2.29 -0.017 0.095 -0.18
County 2 Akershus  -0.032 0.008 -3.98 -0.036 0.016 -2.3 -0.100 0.054 -1.85 -0.002 0.090 -0.03
County 4 Hedmark  -0.026 0.012 -2.14 -0.069 0.035 -1.98 -0.132 0.055 -2.42 -0.013 0.095 -0.14
County 5 Oppland  -0.041 0.013 -3.22 -0.046 0.044 -1.04 -0.141 0.055 -2.55 -0.012 0.102 -0.11
County 6 Buskerud  0.023 0.011 2.15 -0.098 0.031 -3.12 -0.069 0.054 -1.28 -0.052 0.090 -0.57
County 7 Vestfold   -0.045 0.011 -4.15 -0.063 0.030 -2.07 -0.116 0.055 -2.12 -0.008 0.092 -0.09
County 8 Telemark  -0.019 0.011 -1.64 -0.062 0.033 -1.86 -0.104 0.054 -1.91 -0.022 0.092 -0.24
County 9 Aust-Agder  -0.026 0.012 -2.19 -0.084 0.031 -2.7 -0.122 0.055 -2.23 -0.043 0.091 -0.48
County 10 Vest-Agder  -0.018 0.010 -1.7 -0.067 0.031 -2.12 -0.113 0.055 -2.07 -0.029 0.095 -0.31
County 11 Rogaland  -0.010 0.008 -1.21 -0.042 0.025 -1.66 -0.092 0.054 -1.7 -0.010 0.091 -0.11
County 12 Hordaland  -0.034 0.007 -4.74 -0.071 0.017 -4.08 -0.123 0.054 -2.27 -0.003 0.092 -0.03
County 13 Sogn og Fjordane  -0.018 0.014 -1.28 -0.102 0.029 -3.47 -0.114 0.055 -2.07 -0.023 0.096 -0.24
County 14 Møre og Romsdal  -0.018 0.010 -1.7 -0.045 0.026 -1.73 -0.124 0.055 -2.26 -0.030 0.096 -0.31
County 15 Sør-Trøndelag  -0.027 0.009 -3.04 -0.033 0.029 -1.16 -0.137 0.054 -2.52 -0.045 0.090 -0.51
County 16 Nord-Trøndelag  -0.015 0.012 -1.27 -0.066 0.036 -1.83 -0.134 0.055 -2.44 -0.028 0.099 -0.29
County 17 Nordland  -0.053 0.011 -4.97 -0.076 0.028 -2.67 -0.118 0.054 -2.17 -0.008 0.094 -0.09
County 18 Troms  -0.057 0.015 -3.69 -0.043 0.034 -1.27 -0.125 0.054 -2.31 -0.032 0.090 -0.35
County 19 Finnmark  -0.089 0.017 -5.26 -0.062 0.046 -1.36 -0.104 0.055 -1.88 -0.069 0.093 -0.74
                       
Municipal Centrality (7=Most 
central)                       
Municipal Centrality 1  -0.006 0.008 -0.73 -0.029 0.030 -0.96 -0.006 0.007 -0.9 -0.008 0.017 -0.48
Municipal Centrality 2  0.002 0.009 0.24 0.008 0.021 0.39 -0.007 0.009 -0.87 -0.018 0.027 -0.67
Municipal Centrality 3  -0.007 0.008 -0.85 0.007 0.021 0.33 -0.008 0.007 -1.05 0.021 0.022 0.98
Municipal Centrality 4  -0.014 0.014 -1.02 -0.133 0.053 -2.5 0.002 0.009 0.19 0.017 0.023 0.74
Municipal Centrality 5  0.013 0.008 1.67 -0.018 0.019 -0.92 0.014 0.009 1.56 0.001 0.025 0.02
Municipal Centrality 6  0.004 0.006 0.72 0.000 0.015 -0.03 -0.012 0.006 -1.96 0.011 0.015 0.74
                       
Selection term  0.057 0.032 1.76 0.022 0.048 0.45 -0.136 0.066 -2.04 -0.118 0.087 -1.36
                       
Constant 4.755 0.381 12.48   7.107 1.116 6.37   4.840 0.486 9.97   4.366 1.568 2.78
                       
sigma  ui                       
R2  0.1429     0.1369     0.0716     0.0816  
R S S                        
Number of observations  4,863         758         4,652         550     
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Appendix 2.2. A switching regression model to identify the hospital premium 
 
Table A2.ii Hospital choice, probit models, marginal effects (Case c and d). 
                    
 
Case c)  
Hospital choice if shift RNs       
Case d)  
Hospital choice if daytime RNs   
  Reduced form     Structural form    Reduced form     Structural form 
                         
Variable dF/dx Std. E.t-values  dF/dx Std. E.t-values  dF/dx Std. E.t-values  dF/dx Std. E.t-values
 
Hospital premium       -0.915 0.756 -1.21      -4.368 4.305 -1.02
                    
Married -0.049 0.012 -4.02 -0.056 0.013 -4.17 0.017 0.035 0.48 0.027 0.037 0.74
No. of children <6 years of 
age 0.000 0.013 -0.03 0.000 0.013 -0.02 0.017 0.039 0.42 0.027 0.041 0.67
No. of children aged 6-11  -0.046 0.010 -4.72 -0.052 0.011 -4.8 -0.054 0.028 -1.95 -0.088 0.044 -2.02
                    
Age -0.815 0.139 -5.85 -0.858 0.144 -5.97 -0.293 0.490 -0.6 -0.905 0.780 -1.16
Age^2/100 2.857 0.511 5.59 3.052 0.536 5.7 1.027 1.706 0.6 3.025 2.616 1.16
Age^3/1000 -4.361 0.810 -5.39 -4.707 0.859 -5.48 -1.578 2.578 -0.61 -4.348 3.770 -1.16
Age^4/10000 2.422 0.469 5.16 2.637 0.502 5.25 0.888 1.430 0.62 2.272 1.985 1.15
Experience -0.004 0.018 -0.24 -0.013 0.020 -0.68 -0.167 0.083 -2.01 -0.179 0.085 -2.11
Experience^2/100 0.309 0.310 1 0.461 0.334 1.38 2.808 1.188 2.36 3.718 1.505 2.48
Experience^3/1000 -2.823 1.952 -1.45 -3.743 2.096 -1.79 -15.701 6.715 -2.34 -24.005 10.674 -2.26
Experience^4/10000 7.120 4.055 1.76 8.929 4.324 2.07 28.749 12.928 2.22 49.125 24.043 2.05
Born in a Nordic country 
excl. Norway  0.029 0.030 0.97 0.025 0.031 0.82 0.117 0.070 1.55 0.151 0.074 1.85
Born in an OECD country 
excl. Nordic  0.016 0.037 0.43 0.039 0.041 0.95 -0.160 0.109 -1.48 -0.080 0.135 -0.6
Born in a non-OECD country  -0.136 0.036 -3.69 -0.132 0.036 -3.56 -0.013 0.151 -0.09 0.022 0.152 0.15
                    
Place of residency 
(C3=Oslo)                    
County 1 Østfold  -0.534 0.014 -17.3 -0.518 0.021 -11.93 -0.612 0.036 -7.44 -0.573 0.064 -4.65
County 2 Akershus  -0.530 0.014 -17.64 -0.514 0.021 -11.8  -0.611  0.039 -8.2 -0.626 0.036 -7.58
County 4 Hedmark  -0.535 0.011 -17.59 -0.520 0.019 -10.59 -0.614 0.031 -7.43 -0.611 0.031 -7.44
County 5 Oppland  -0.532 0.012 -17.22 -0.518 0.019 -11.75 -0.6160.028  -7.23 -0.555 0.100 -2.72
County 6 Buskerud  -0.518 0.014 -16.6 -0.496 0.025 -9.38 -0.634 0.028 -8.94 -0.646 0.025 -7.17
County 7 Vestfold   -0.509 0.016 -15.1 -0.493 0.022 -11.29 -0.616 0.036 -7.29 -0.628 0.032 -6.75
County 8 Telemark  -0.507 0.015 -15 -0.488 0.025 -9.72 -0.627 0.027 -7.85 -0.625 0.027 -7.9
County 9 Aust-Agder  -0.506 0.015 -14.68 -0.484 0.027 -8.51 -0.623 0.029 -7.88 -0.630 0.025 -7.2
County 10 Vest-Agder  -0.494 0.018 -14.97 -0.469 0.030 -9.11 -0.562 0.049 -6.5 -0.513 0.080 -4.17
County 11 Rogaland  -0.558 0.014 -19.12 -0.540 0.023 -11.98 -0.654 0.031 -9.51 -0.644 0.034 -8.92
County 12 Hordaland  -0.531 0.018 -16.95 -0.504 0.031 -9.74 -0.548 0.056 -6.68 -0.5900.060  -5.57
County 13 Sogn og Fjordane  -0.521 0.012 -15.03 -0.506 0.020 -9.82 -0.593 0.042 -5.91 -0.609 0.035 -5.54
County 14 Møre og Romsdal  -0.584 0.011 -20.12 -0.569 0.018 -11.81 -0.659 0.030 -8.25 -0.617 0.066 -4.18
County 15 Sør-Trøndelag  -0.435 0.025 -12.02 -0.380 0.057 -5.09 -0.577 0.048 -7.1 -0.485 0.124 -2.85
County 16 Nord-Trøndelag  -0.526 0.014 -16.78 -0.504 0.027 -9.01 -0.584 0.044 -6.4 -0.501 0.122 -2.68
County 17 Nordland  -0.545 0.013 -17.69 -0.536 0.016 -14.28 -0.628 0.034 -7.52 -0.644 0.030 -6.3
County 18 Troms  -0.567 0.007 -22.63 -0.563 0.008 -18.06 -0.654 0.020 -9.63 -0.650 0.021 -9.48
County 19 Finnmark  -0.514 0.012 -13.21 -0.513 0.012 -13.26 -0.502 0.085 -3.69 -0.403 0.164 -1.97
                    
Municipal Centrality (7=Most 
central)                     
Municipal Centrality 1  -0.217 0.021 -9.62 -0.216 0.021 -9.5 -0.462 0.054 -6.65 -0.563 0.089 -3.66
Municipal Centrality 2  0.042 0.028 1.48 0.049 0.029 1.69 0.152 0.072 1.9 0.240 0.096 1.96
Municipal Centrality 3  0.088 0.025 3.45 0.090 0.025 3.5 0.193 0.060 2.8 0.143 0.083 1.58
Municipal Centrality 4  -0.336 0.026 -10.19 -0.352 0.028 -9.48 -0.493 0.073 -4.32 -0.633 0.029 -1.86
Municipal Centrality 5  -0.035 0.026 -1.34 -0.030 0.026 -1.13 -0.214 0.072 -2.96 -0.386 0.160 -2.02
Municipal Centrality 6  0.016 0.020 0.82   0.031 0.023 1.33   0.069 0.056 1.21   -0.002 0.092 -0.02
                     
Log likelihood  -5,992.8 -5,992.1 -747.42 -746.88   
chi squared  2,082.8 2,084.2 401.9 402.9    
significance level  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
pseudo R2  0.148 0.1482 0.2119 0.2124   
Number of observations 10,150 10,150 1,392 1,392    
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1                     
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Table A3.ii Wage equations, sample selection models. Hospital RNs and primary care RNs. 
(Case c and d) 
        
  
Case c)  
Wage equations if shift RNs   
Case d)  
Wage equations if daytime RNs 
                          
    Hospital workers    Primary care workers    Hospital workers     Primary care workers 
                              
      Coef.    Std.E.t-values   Coef.   Std.E.t-values   Coef.    Std.E. t-values  Coef.     Std.E. t-values 
Age   -0.058 0.043 -1.34 -0.135 0.052 -2.58 -0.214 0.107 -2 -0.118  0.127 -0.93
Age^2/100   0.262 0.160 1.64 0.481 0.186 2.59 0.773 0.370 2.09 0.470  0.441 1.07
Age^3/1000   -0.474 0.255 -1.86 -0.745 0.286 -2.61 -1.196 0.555 -2.15 -0.799  0.666 -1.2
Age^4/10000   0.297 0.149 1.99 0.421 0.161 2.61 0.669 0.306 2.18 0.485  0.370 1.31
Experience   0.006 0.005 1.17  0.015  0.005 2.79 -0.010 0.021 -0.5 -0.032  0.023 -1.4
Experience^2/100   0.041 0.086 0.47 -0.083 0.090 -0.92 0.256 0.294 0.87 0.453  0.340 1.33
Experience^3/1000   -0.589 0.553 -1.07 0.040 0.564 0.07 -1.793 1.627 -1.1 -2.162  1.930 -1.12
Experience^4/10000   1.532 1.170 1.31 0.489 1.168 0.42 3.946 3.070 1.29 3.436  3.698 0.93
Born in a Nordic country excl. 
Norway   0.011 0.008 1.38 0.020 0.009 2.14 0.002 0.015 0.12 0.011  0.023 0.48
Born in an OECD country 
excl. Nordic    0.015 0.011 1.39 -0.009 0.011 -0.75 0.044 0.025 1.77 0.004  0.026 0.16
Born in a non-OECD country    0.008 0.011 0.79 -0.015 0.012 -1.24 0.036 0.025 1.47 0.026  0.037 0.69
                        
Place of residency (C3=Oslo)                        
County 1 Østfold    -0.099 0.015 -6.46 -0.335 0.064 -5.25 -0.040 0.035 -1.16 -0.210  0.127 -1.65
County 2 Akershus    -0.084 0.015 -5.63 -0.323 0.064 -5.05 -0.033 0.031 -1.08 -0.161  0.124 -1.29
County 4 Hedmark    -0.095 0.019 -5.09 -0.359 0.065 -5.5 -0.058 0.043 -1.35 -0.209  0.130 -1.61
County 5 Oppland    -0.108 0.017 -6.32 -0.352 0.065 -5.45 -0.031 0.044 -0.69 -0.239  0.132 -1.81
County 6 Buskerud    -0.035 0.015 -2.29 -0.290 0.064 -4.55 -0.087 0.040 -2.16 -0.225  0.132 -1.71
County 7 Vestfold     -0.097 0.015 -6.5 -0.319 0.063 -5.06 -0.053 0.037 -1.45 -0.184  0.128 -1.43
County 8 Telemark    -0.072 0.015 -4.72 -0.311 0.063 -4.92 -0.052 0.045 -1.16 -0.210  0.133 -1.58
County 9 Aust-Agder    -0.081 0.016 -4.89 -0.337 0.064 -5.29 -0.074 0.041 -1.82 -0.216  0.131 -1.64
County 10 Vest-Agder    -0.068 0.013 -5.33 -0.298 0.062 -4.81 -0.055 0.026 -2.08 -0.201  0.119 -1.69
County 11 Rogaland    -0.071 0.015 -4.61 -0.317 0.065 -4.92 -0.033 0.038 -0.87 -0.198  0.131 -1.51
County 12 Hordaland    -0.081 0.013 -6.39 -0.321 0.063 -5.13 -0.066 0.022 -2.96 -0.162  0.116 -1.4
County 13 Sogn og Fjordane    -0.077 0.019 -3.93 -0.333 0.065 -5.12 -0.096 0.039 -2.44 -0.216  0.127 -1.7
County 14 Møre og Romsdal    -0.092 0.021 -4.46 -0.368 0.067 -5.5 -0.040 0.045 -0.87 -0.238  0.133 -1.79
County 15 Sør-Trøndelag    -0.062 0.009 -6.72 -0.300 0.060 -5.05 -0.022 0.026 -0.85 -0.186  0.119 -1.56
County 16 Nord-Trøndelag    -0.078 0.016 -4.85 -0.341 0.064 -5.33 -0.053 0.033 -1.6 -0.228  0.124 -1.84
County 17 Nordland    -0.116 0.018 -6.55 -0.343 0.065 -5.29 -0.069 0.042 -1.64 -0.195  0.129 -1.51
County 18 Troms    -0.156 0.029 -5.4 -0.414 0.070 -5.91 -0.038 0.060 -0.64 -0.228  0.141 -1.62
County 19 Finnmark    -0.150 0.022 -6.9 -0.334 0.066 -5.1 -0.057 0.046 -1.22 -0.206  0.119 -1.74
                        
Municipal Centrality (7=Most 
central)                        
Municipal Centrality 1    -0.033 0.010 -3.34 -0.058 0.009 -6.28 -0.024 0.042 -0.58 -0.048  0.034 -1.42
Municipal Centrality 2    0.007 0.009 0.79 0.004 0.009 0.49 0.007 0.023 0.3 0.003  0.031 0.09
Municipal Centrality 3    0.000 0.008 0.05 0.009 0.008 1.15 0.007 0.025 0.28 0.049  0.026 1.87
Municipal Centrality 4    -0.054 0.017 -3.15 -0.068 0.014 -4.85 -0.132 0.063 -2.11 -0.058  0.041 -1.43
Municipal Centrality 5    0.007 0.008 0.84 -0.004 0.008 -0.5 -0.015 0.022 -0.71 -0.005  0.024 -0.19
Municipal Centrality 6    0.004 0.006 0.69 -0.010 0.006 -1.73 -0.001 0.016 -0.05 0.024  0.016 1.54
                        
Selection term    0.071 0.019 3.79 -0.159 0.024 -6.58 0.000 0.040 0.01 -0.090  0.051 -1.76
                        
Constant     5.533 0.428 12.94   6.964 0.579 12.03   7.145 1.121 6.38   6.368  1.363 4.67
Notes. The dependent variable is the log hourly wage rate. 
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Appendix 3 A random utility model 
 
Table A4 Predicted hourly wages 
                                      
Heckman selection model                    
two-step estimates  Hospital RNs          Primary care RNs       
Hourly  wage    Shift     Day     Shift     Day    
                     
   Coef.  Std. E.  t-values Coef.  Std.  E.  t-values Coef.  Std.  E.  t-values Coef.  Std.  E.  t-values 
Age -0.039  0.091  -0.440  -0.261  0.127  -2.060 0.140  0.081  1.720  -0.070 0.120  -0.580 
Age^2/100 0.198  0.337  0.590  0.926 0.439  2.110  -0.476 0.293 -1.630  0.311  0.419  0.740 
Age^3/1000 -0.376  0.541  -0.690  -1.410 0.658  -2.140  0.707 0.460 1.540  -0.571  0.635  -0.900 
Age^4/10000 0.246  0.318  0.770  0.778 0.363  2.140  -0.385 0.264 -1.460  0.366  0.353  1.040 
Experience 0.012  0.012  0.990  -0.006 0.022  -0.260  0.004 0.011  0.400 -0.010  0.019  -0.530 
Experience^2/100 -0.083  0.201  -0.410 0.260  0.311  0.840 0.058 0.175  0.330  0.109 0.281  0.390 
Experience^3/1000 0.321  1.292  0.250 -2.053  1.743  -1.180 -0.617 1.090  -0.570  -0.270 1.616  -0.170 
Experience^4/10000 -0.606  2.733 -0.220  4.750  3.354  1.420 1.484  2.254  0.660  -0.013 3.163  0.000 
Born in a Nordic country 
excl. Norway  -0.005  0.019  -0.250  0.001  0.016 0.040  0.003  0.018 0.170  -0.003 0.021  -0.120 
Born in an OECD country 
excl. Nordic  -0.009  0.025  -0.360  0.035  0.029 1.210  -0.018  0.021  -0.830 0.022  0.023  0.940 
Born in a non-OECD country   0.009  0.023  0.390  0.053 0.031  1.690  -0.001 0.021 -0.070  0.022  0.037  0.600 
County 1 Østfold  -0.021  0.022  -0.940 -0.033  0.023  -1.450  0.138  0.119 1.160  -0.073  0.109  -0.670 
County 2 Akershus  -0.026  0.018 -1.420  -0.026  0.016 -1.560  0.171 0.125  1.370  -0.029 0.109  -0.260 
County 4 Hedmark  -0.014  0.026  -0.560 -0.041  0.029  -1.410  0.151  0.126 1.200  -0.065  0.107  -0.610 
County 5 Oppland  -0.028  0.025  -1.110 -0.015  0.032  -0.480  0.158  0.128 1.230  -0.091  0.109  -0.830 
County 6 Buskerud  0.017  0.019  0.890  -0.097  0.022 -4.380  0.192  0.123  1.560  -0.076 0.111  -0.690 
County 7 Vestfold   -0.043  0.022  -1.980  -0.046 0.025  -1.840  0.142 0.120  1.190 -0.045  0.109  -0.410 
County 8 Telemark  -0.010  0.024 -0.420  -0.048  0.028 -1.700  0.166 0.124  1.330  -0.056 0.103  -0.540 
County 9 Aust-Agder  -0.035  0.025 -1.420  -0.071  0.026 -2.700  0.140 0.123  1.140  -0.070 0.113  -0.620 
County 10 Vest-Agder  -0.028  0.017 -1.660  -0.051  0.018 -2.750  0.167 0.124  1.340  -0.086 0.113  -0.770 
County 11 Rogaland  0.002  0.018  0.130  -0.023 0.018  -1.320  0.179 0.123 1.460  -0.048  0.107  -0.450 
County 12 Hordaland  -0.025  0.016 -1.570  -0.066  0.014 -4.840  0.155 0.124  1.250  -0.051 0.108  -0.480 
County 13 Sogn og Fjordane  0.001  0.032 0.020  -0.073  0.034  -2.120  0.169 0.125  1.350  -0.084 0.115  -0.730 
County 14 Møre og Romsdal  -0.019 0.022  -0.860  -0.036 0.026  -1.360  0.159 0.124  1.280  -0.091 0.115  -0.790 
County 15 Sør-Trøndelag  -0.033  0.015 -2.250  -0.011  0.017 -0.660  0.146 0.130  1.120  -0.069 0.113  -0.610 
County 16 Nord-Trøndelag  -0.023  0.020 -1.110  -0.037  0.026 -1.430  0.159 0.127  1.250  -0.100 0.110  -0.910 
County 17 Nordland  -0.042  0.023 -1.820  -0.063  0.028 -2.250  0.164 0.126  1.300  -0.055 0.112  -0.500 
County 18 Troms  -0.022  0.039  -0.570 -0.027  0.038  -0.730  0.156  0.128 1.220  -0.058  0.111  -0.530 
County 19 Finnmark  -0.076  0.038  -2.000 -0.037  0.054  -0.700  0.181  0.131 1.380  -0.099  0.116  -0.850 
Municipal Centrality 1  -0.006  0.017  -0.370  -0.028 0.033  -0.850  -0.011 0.011 -1.010  0.007  0.013  0.530 
Municipal Centrality 2  0.017  0.020 0.830  -0.002  0.025  -0.090 0.004  0.016  0.250  -0.022 0.026  -0.830 
Municipal Centrality 3  -0.009  0.018  -0.520  0.008 0.024  0.350  -0.005 0.014 -0.330  0.023  0.021  1.110 
Municipal Centrality 4  0.004  0.032  0.130 -0.145  0.059  -2.460 -0.002 0.015  -0.110  0.002 0.020  0.110 
Municipal Centrality 5  0.011  0.018  0.640  -0.015 0.022  -0.700  0.013 0.015 0.850  0.024  0.017 1.450 
Municipal Centrality 6  0.004  0.013  0.340 -0.001  0.018  -0.080 -0.002 0.012  -0.170  0.015 0.014  1.020 
Constant 5.288  0.877  6.030 7.630  1.325  5.760 3.419  0.857 3.990  5.598  1.250 4.480 
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Table 4 continued. Selection term.  
                     
Selection term  Hospital RNs          Primary care RNs       
  Shift     Day     Shift     Day    
                      

















                      
Married -0.038  0.069  -0.550  -0.127 0.204  -0.620 -0.130 0.068  -1.930 -0.130 0.244 -0.530 
No. Of children <6 
years of age  -0.268  0.070  -3.830  -0.512  0.191  -2.680 -0.295 0.061  -4.810 -0.242 0.215 -1.120 
No. of children aged 6-
11 -0.204  0.055  -3.720  -0.049 0.157  -0.310 -0.092 0.048  -1.920 -0.215 0.168 -1.280 
                      
Age -0.953  0.816  -1.170  -0.620 2.434  -0.250  2.080 0.726  2.870 -6.314 6.847 -0.920 




















Experience 0.097  0.099  0.980  0.036 0.401  0.090 -0.172 0.101  -1.690 -0.662 0.647 -1.020 





































Born in a Nordic country 
excl. Norway  -0.231  0.131  -1.770  0.100  0.326  0.310 -0.154 0.148  -1.040 -0.161 0.536 -0.300 
Born in an OECD 
country excl. Nordic  -0.369  0.160  -2.300  -0.600 0.492  -1.220 -0.069 0.192 -0.360 4.964  .  . 
Born in a non-OECD 
country   -0.144  0.173  -0.830  5.439  . .  -0.278  0.153  -1.820  5.306  . . 
County 1 Østfold  0.705  0.196 3.590  0.452  0.609 0.740 2.008  0.332  6.040 1.931  0.816 2.370 
County 2 Akershus  0.185  0.140 1.330  0.356  0.358 0.990  2.396 0.334  7.160  1.895 0.751  2.520 
County 4 Hedmark  0.502  0.228  2.210  5.853 .  .  2.465  0.351  7.030 1.546  0.796 1.940 
County 5 Oppland  0.644  0.230  2.800  5.297 .  .  2.679  0.355  7.550 1.877  0.852 2.200 
County 6 Buskerud  0.081  0.148  0.550  -0.660  0.382 -1.730 2.246  0.337  6.670 2.557  0.825 3.100 
County 7 Vestfold   0.211  0.179  1.180  0.407 0.600  0.680  2.044 0.342  5.970 1.775  0.830 2.140 
County 8 Telemark  0.390  0.202 1.940  0.171  0.635 0.270  2.300 0.351  6.540  1.484 0.778  1.910 
County 9 Aust-Agder  0.008 0.189  0.040  0.315 0.651 0.480  2.239  0.354 6.320 7.280  .  . 
County 10 Vest-Agder  0.042 0.129  0.330  0.211 0.400 0.530  2.362  0.337 7.000 7.178  .  . 
County 11 Rogaland  0.466  0.139 3.370  0.674  0.516 1.310 2.324  0.326  7.140 1.757  0.740 2.370 
County 12 Hordaland  0.303  0.119 2.540  -0.108  0.256  -0.420  2.372 0.327  7.260  1.805 0.747  2.420 
County 13 Sogn og 
Fjordane 0.697  0.414  1.680  5.841  .  . 2.404  0.359  6.690 7.453  .  . 
County 14 Møre og 
Romsdal 0.123  0.184  0.670 0.310  0.587  0.530 2.378  0.338 7.040 7.450  .  . 
County 15 Sør-
Trøndelag 0.076  0.111  0.680  0.694  0.530 1.310  2.789  0.358 7.780 7.075  .  . 
County 16 Nord-
Trøndelag 0.066  0.161  0.410  5.765  .  . 2.557  0.350  7.320 2.199 0.843  2.610 
County 17 Nordland  0.389  0.196 1.990  0.309  0.633 0.490  2.482 0.343  7.230  2.517 0.848  2.970 
County 18 Troms  5.177  .  .  4.938  .  . 2.593  0.337  7.700 2.382 0.845  2.820 
County 19 Finnmark  0.492  0.427  1.150  5.320 .  .  2.794  0.448  6.240  7.363 .  . 
Municipal Centrality 1  0.052  0.157 0.330  -0.103  0.705  -0.150 -0.010 0.108  -0.090 -0.288 0.323 -0.890 
Municipal Centrality 2  0.341  0.193 1.770  -0.683  0.581  -1.180  0.237 0.175  1.360 -0.622 0.589  -1.060 
Municipal Centrality 3  -0.070  0.156  -0.450  0.018 0.555  0.030  0.069 0.135  0.510 -0.422 0.571 -0.740 
Municipal Centrality 4  0.623  0.421  1.480  -0.343 0.788  -0.430 -0.170 0.134 -1.270 5.272  .  . 
Municipal Centrality 5  0.028  0.150 0.180  -0.031  0.595  -0.050  0.180 0.160  1.130 -0.304 0.407  -0.750 
Municipal Centrality 6  0.011  0.124  0.090  -0.115 0.447  -0.260  0.216 0.103 2.110 0.012  0.335 0.030 
_cons 
11.21












                     
Mills lambda  0.244  0.111  2.200 0.099  0.058  1.690 0.203 0.079  2.560 -0.015 0.049  -0.290 
rho  1*     1*     1*     -0.170    
Number of observations  5,154      803      4,996      589     
Wald chi2 
216.1
6    
115.4
5    
226.1
0     68.35    
Prob >chi2  0.000        0.000        0.000        0.242       
Note: two-step estimate of rho = rho is being truncated to 1               
                     
* For the hours above 100%, which means 35.5 hours per week for shift workers and 37.5 hours per week for daytime workers, 
the hourly wage is increased by 50%.   
** Marital status and number of children are used as selection variables to correct for the selection into the respective 
job-types. Mills lambda is the selection correction. 40 
 
Table A5 Estimated parameters in the RUM model 
    Shift vs. daytime work      Shift vs. daytime work   
    for hospital nurses      for primary care nurses workers 
                
               
      Est.  St. E.  t-values     Est.  St.  E.  t-values 
                
  Utility function             
β0  Constant ’leisure 
element’ 
6.567 0.884  7.427    3.688 0.788  4.681 
β1 
Age/10 -0.325  0.062  -5.243   0.371  0.267  1.389 
β2 
Age/10 squared         -0.068  0.030  -2.282 
β3 
No. of children < 6 years 
of age  -0.098 0.087  -1.123    -0.175 0.068  -2.575 
β4 
No. of children 5< years 
of age<12  -0.269 0.074  -3.656    -0.252 0.054  -4.688 
β5  Born in Norway          -0.240  0.100  -2.408 
β5  Married -0.601  0.114  -5.289   -0.225  0.076  -2.976 











                
α   Constant ‘consumption 
element’ 







0.285 0.148  1.922    0.405 0.149  2.725 
                
  Opportunity density*             
ς   1 if the job is full-time, 0 
otherwise 
1.064 0.082  12.976    0.758 0.091  8.311 
               
                
 
Number of observations 
3,354      
3,928    
  Log likelihood  -8,835.5       -10,136.5    
   McFadden's Rho  0.089           0.107       
γ
λ41 
Table A6  Differences in consumption, deterministic utility and compensating variation in the RUM-model 
Hospital                             
                                                 





  disposable income, NOK      deterministic utility      per year, NOK    positive   
of hours   Shift job - Daytime job      Shift job - Daytime job      Compensating variation    k CV     
% of full-
time  Mean Std  D  Min  Max    Mean Std  D  Min  Max     Mean  Std  D  Min  Max  Mean 
 
32.5 %  7 329  2 400  -2 125  17 264    0.148  0.040  0.025 0.405   -12  278 21 294  -101 625  66 453  0.29   
50 %  11 404  3 735  -3 306  26 868    0.226  0.055  0.052 0.563   4  023 17 774  -69 672  79 375  0.62   
60 %  13 175  4 345  -3 984  32 008    0.265  0.060  0.073 0.632   7  412 18 613  -61 594  85 266  0.68   
75 %  15 294  5 015  -4 433  36 784    0.319  0.064  0.111 0.697   12  671 19 585  -68 375  75 203  0.76   
80 %  16 392  5 368  -4 752  38 688    0.344  0.067  0.127 0.733   15  240 19 655  -80 141  88 516  0.80   
86 %  17 771  5 819  -5 152  41 864    0.378  0.071  0.150 0.782   18  764 20 181  -76 563  100 922  0.83   
100 %  19 063  6 283  -5 968  48 024    0.439  0.073  0.206 0.874   26  317 20 907  -63 680  96 500  0.90   
103 %  18 480  6 362  -6 195  48 496    0.446  0.073  0.221 0.888   26  610 21 198  -48 797  114 828  0.90   
115 %  20 525  6 524  -5 066  51 024     0.518  0.071  0.303 0.951     34  841 21 802  -47 164  116 922  0.94   
N=3354                              
                              
Primary care                              
                                                 





  disposable income, NOK      deterministic utility      per year, NOK    positive   
of hours   Shift job - Daytime job      Shift job - Daytime job      Compensating variation    k CV    
% of full-
time  Mean Std  D  Min  Max    Mean Std  D  Min  Max     Mean  Std  D  Min  Max  Mean 
 
32.5 %  5 767  2 286  -6 419  13 354    0.121  0.033  -0.033 0.258   -13  896 22 184  -105 078  57 000  0.27   
50 %  8 974  3 557  -9 988  20 780    0.191  0.045  -0.028 0.377   2  276 18 612  -87 266  65 797  0.57   
60 %  10 315  4 114  -12 036  24 264    0.229  0.050  -0.017 0.438   6  006 19 273  -96 641  95 391  0.64   
75 %  12 033  4 769  -13 394  27 864    0.286  0.054  0.019 0.505   11  925 20 035  -74 188  76 328  0.74   
80 %  12 898  5 112  -14 358  29 868    0.313  0.057  0.032 0.542   14  524 19 753  -66 953  86 563  0.78   
86 %  13 983  5 542  -15 566  32 384    0.350  0.060  0.051 0.591   18  478 20 571  -70 406  90 484  0.82   
100 %  14 937  5 907  -18 028  35 304    0.424  0.061  0.105 0.689   27  414 21 188  -56 922  116 031  0.90   
103 %  14 188  5 906  -18 772  35 232    0.434  0.060  0.128 0.701   28  128 21 427  -47 672  95 000  0.90   
115 %  16 299  6 174  -16 672  36 768     0.530  0.061  0.223 0.776     39  192 21 920  -42 875  134 313  0.96   
N=3928                             





















Figure A1 Hospital nurses – Full-time 
Clockwise: 
Quadrant 1: The difference in disposable income for full-time jobs (shift job – daytime job). 
Quadrant 2: The difference in deterministic utility for full-time jobs (shift job – daytime job). 
Quadrant 3: Compensating variation (
7 CV ) for full-time jobs (shift job – daytime job). 
Quadrant 4: Share with positive and negative 













































Figure A2. Shift compensation for hospital nurses 
The mean of the compensating variation,
k CV , by categories of hours. 





































Figure A3. Shift compensation for hospital nurses 
The share of the nurses with 
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Figure A4. Shift compensation for hospital nurses. 
The mean of the compensating variation,




 CV (NOK) 50% Position  CV (NOK)  75% Position
 CV (NOK)  100% Position










Figure A5. Shift compensation for primary care nurses 
The mean of the compensating variation, 
k CV , by age. 50%, 75% and 100% position. 
 
 
 
 